I'm not saying that Ukraine shouldn't weaponize itself against Russians at all, but I stand by position that Ukraine as a proof of concept could be, was, and will be viable only as a bridge between West and Russia, not as a fortress on Dnieper decorated with Balkenkreuz-styled banners.

In a role of such fortress, it will inevitably crumble and disintegrate due to internal conflicts, mainly between aggressive integral Ukrainian far right nationalism and Russian-speaking populace, even in absence of Russian aggressors.

The situation there across Ukraine is not much unlike Ulster Troubles for Great Britain, although Ukrainian language always enjoyed much greater levels of proficiency among citizens than Irish. However, Russian clearly dominated, despite lacking official status, and this fact is even recognized through special mention of Russian language in the Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution. (This article had been largely ignored by officials and “activists”.)

Hence, Ukraine had its only chance to grip triumphant victory quickly, taking necessary rolls with the punch, before Russia began to learn on its gross mistakes. Zelensky initially stated exactly that.

It almost happened in March 2022, but Johnson, as it's now widely known, sabotaged Istanbul peace agreements. In this, he inadvertently (?) repeated the mistake of Pericles, who advised the Athenians not to revoke the Megarian Decree. It didn’t come out well for Pericles, Athens, or Boris. (Further longread courtesy of mine, in Russian, about parallels between Ukraine war and Peloponnesian war, could be found here, if you comprehend Russian. Sure, it’s fully optional reading.)

Now the stated goal to reach 1991 borders appears mythical and serves only for stretching the war as long as Zelensky and neocon Dems deem it necessary, with horrendous results for Ukraine. The war is the goal, not the mean by which the goal should be achieved. For all participants.