To give one random example, total territorial changes across the Ukrainian front in 2023 were positive for Russia and negative for Ukraine.

Also, in 2023 Russian forces took the ruins of Bakhmut, where Zelensky and Zaluzhny had allowed many of experienced, trained, motivated Ukrainian soldiers to perish for naught while at the same time busy beaver Surovikin was feverishly building not one, not two, but three solid defense lines on Zaporizhzhya and Southern Donbass directions, adding to them fields sown with mines to levels not seen since Flanders Fields.

Due to such rigorous preparations, Russia managed to break much-hyped counteroffensive by UAF on the very first line of defense, whereas according to spring plans Ukrainian army should have captured Tokmak and Melitopol at the least already during first couple of weeks into the counteroffensive.

Everything considered, 2023 became the year when Ukraine lost momentum on land, albeit executed a few successful operations in the Black Sea, severely crippling opportunities of the Russian fleet stationed in Crimea and Novorossiysk.

However, all attempts to enact landing operation in Crimea sizzled quickly.

But, of course, you’ve already known all that before… ಠ_ಠ

I would say that despite 2023 was, definitely, more successful for Russia than for Ukraine, in the longer term Ukrainian fronts will likely have stalled completely, as in case of Iran-Iraq conflict under mostly similar conditions. Unlike Iran-Iraq clash, some 5 to 10 years down the road division of Ukraine will probably become a matter of implicit unwritten fact. But this is where I’d be glad to make a mistake.