Sure, the smartest strategy was not to play. Ukraine as a proof of concept could be, was, and will be viable only as a bridge between West and Russia, not as a fortress on Dnieper decorated with Balkenkreuz-styled banners.

In a role of such fortress, it will inevitably crumble and disintegrate due to internal conflicts, Russian aggression or looming menace isn't even needed.

Look attentively at the linguistic map of Ukraine from circa 2009, i.e., less than 5 years before Maidan coup, Donbass uprising, civil war, and subsequent Russian intervention.

You will see that this country in its 2013 borders would be, as it is now, simply unsastainable as a strictly unitary state, controlled by nationalistic, Russophobic, fully Ukrainian minority.

The situation across Ukraine is not much unlike Ulster Troubles for the Great Britain, although Ukrainian language always enjoyed much greater levels of proficiency among citizens than Irish. However, Russian clearly dominated, despite lacking official status, and this fact is even recognized through special mention of Russian language in the Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution. (This article had been largely ignored by officials and “activists”.)